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Abstract
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the growing literature on financial networks has
widely documented the predictive power of topological characteristics (e.g. degree centrality
measures) to explain the systemic impact or systemic vulnerability of financial institutions.
In this work, we show that considering alternative topological measures based on local sub-
network environment improves our ability to identify systemic institutions. To provide em-
pirical evidence, we apply a two-step procedure. First, we recover network communities (i.e.
close-peer environment) on a spillover network of financial institutions. Second, we regress
alternative measures of vulnerability on three levels of topological measures: the global level
(i.e. firm topological characteristics computed over the whole system), local level (i.e. firm
topological characteristics computed over the community) and aggregated level by averaging
individual characteristics over the community. The sample includes 46 financial institutions
(banks, broker-dealers, insurance and real-estate companies) listed in the Standard & Poor’s
500 index. Our results confirm the informational content of topological metrics based on
close-peer environment. Such information is different from the one embeds in traditional sys-
tem wide topological metrics and is proved to be predictor of distress for financial institutions
in time of crisis.
1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis characterized by isolated shocks to specific
financial institutions being widespread to the entire system - with the Lehman brothers default
in Autumn 2008 standing out as the most prominent example of such a dramatic sequence -, it
has become crucial to better understand how contagion episodes operate. Since then, increasing
attention has been devoted to understand and measure financial risk at the system level - so called
“systemic risk” - with the aim to guide policy makers in designing adequate macro-prudential
regulation instruments and detect systemically important financial institutions, i.e. the so-called
“SIFIs”. The shift of paradigm from a micro to the macroprudential perspective has contributed
to approach the financial industry as an emergent system and to use tools from network science
to uncover its properties. In this framework, financial institutions are assimilated to the nodes of
the network and the connections between institutions are represented by the edge. The later can
be financially motivated as is the case for cross lending between banks or simply the outcome of
unknown mechanisms resulting in statistical dependence across institutions’ stock returns. Based
on this stylized representation, a common exercise consists in applying centrality measures to flag
risky institutions. The convention is to consider, as risky for the system, institutions with several
outgoing links and as fragile institutions those with several incoming links. The analysis has been
extended to other centrality measures such as Bonacich centrality, Katz centrality or Betweenness
centrality (see for instance [1] ).
While substantial efforts in empirical financial networks have been devoted to retrieve unob-
served connections, less has been done on signal extraction once the network is formed. Our
claim is that centrality measures commonly used in the literature and applied at the network level
ignore important information embedded in sub-part of the network. Such information appears
once the whole system is segmented in smaller-scale and more local environments constituted of
more densely connected nodes. These environments often called communities and emanating from
privileged relationship among certain financial institutions or cross holdings for instance, have the
ability to alleviate the transmission of shocks through feedback effects, being of utmost importance
for risk assessment. To the best of our knowledge however, no existing study is using centrality
measures by combining information at the intra community level along with the usual system
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wide level. We propose to empirically explore this issue in the present contribution. For this
endeavor, we use the market-based approach developed in [2] based on Time-Varying Parameter
Vector AutoRegressive (TVP-VAR) model as well as Granger causality statistical tests on stock
market returns to recover the unobserved spillover network of financial institutions. From there,
we use the Louvain algorithm to identify the different communities constituting the network. This
step is crucial to construct a new set of centrality metrics exclusively based on close-peer infor-
mation. Next, we compute topological characteristics at three different levels: (i) the global level
(i.e. firm topological characteristics computed over the whole system), (ii) local level (i.e. firm
topological characteristics computed over the community), and (iii) aggregated level, by averaging
individual characteristics over the community. We refer to them respectively as Global topological
metrics (GT), Local topological metrics (LT) and Aggregated topological metrics (AT). To assess
the informational content of each measure, we apply Elastic Net regression techniques and test
whether they can explain bank losses during the financial crisis. Our sample includes 46 financial
institutions embedding banks, broker-dealers, insurance and real-estate companies listed in the
Standard & Poor’s 500 index. A evoked down the line, it is similar in size or larger than most
related studies on market-based financial spillovers.
Literature review
Our paper relates to the fast growing literature on contagion in financial network (see [3] for a
survey). A central question in this body of research is whether the network structure enhances
the vulnerability of the financial systems as a whole and of its components. A common measure
to characterize the network structure is the degree distribution. Boss et al. [4], for instance,
document this question by using real data on interbank liabilities in Austria. A similar exercise
is proposed in [5] and [6] for the Brazilian interbank network. In [7], Caldarelli et al. argue that,
like in other types of networks such as social media, degree distribution in financial networks are
found to be well described by a power law. An interesting feature emerging from this research
is the identification of core–periphery structure in financial market especially in interbank net-
works. Thereby, the system is constituted of a small number of highly interconnected banks at
the core along with poorly connected institutions in the periphery (see [8]). Part of the literature
shifts the perspective from the system to individual nodes and extends the analysis to central-
ity measures which are designed to identify the importance of a node in a network ([9]). One
of the primary target of this research is then to assess whether the centrality of nodes explains
their financial vulnerability or systemic importance. To document this issue, several centrality
measures coming from the network science have been applied to financial systems such as degree
centrality, eigenvector centrality or Katz centrality to cite the most frequent. For instance, in
[10], Craig et al. apply a modified version of the eigenvector centrality on German credit register
to explain individual bank risk. They find a negative relationship between centrality measures
and the probability of default. In [11], Martinez-Jaramillo et al, compute several centrality mea-
sures into a composite measure on the Mexican data to characterize the banking system. In [12],
the authors find a positive relationship between the Katz centrality and systemic risk. In these
examples, centrality measures are applied on single layer networks assuming implicitly a unique
source of connection between financial institutions such as contractual obligation. The reality is
however more complex. Potential transmission channels are divers (e.g. cross-lending, derivatives,
similarity, common exposure) leading to multiple corresponding network structures. In order to
feature the different layers, one strand of the literature has developed a holistic approach that
considers multiple channels of transmission while keeping the network representation simple. To
this end, the links are recovered from dependence in stock market price. The approach builds
on the premise that stock price reflects all relevant information regarding an institution. As such
the dependence between stock returns enables to assess whether two institutions are related, re-
gardless of the specific channels through which the transmission occurs. Thereby, it provides a
synthetic measure of interconnectedness between institutions. A pioneer contribution in this vein
has been done by Billio et al. [13], where the authors use Granger-causality test, over monthly
2
returns of hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers, and insurance companies to build their network.
The authors find that it is possible to predict systemic risk of financial institutions out-of-sample
with centrality measures. Further studies in the same spirit were performed in [14, 15, 16]. In
a previous study ([21]), the presence of sub-structures within the network of densely connected
nodes have been documented . Using community detection algorithm, sub-networks across time
in the US market were identified. An interesting finding from this piece of research is that these
sub-network stemming from stock returns dependence does not fully coincide with trivial ex-ante
categories such as financial industries.
Our contribution relates closely to the analysis developed in [13]. The main differences are
threefold. First, we apply a modified procedure, as developed in [2] to retrieve the financial
network. As discussed in [2], this approach is better suited when the underlying network is time
varying. Second, we segment our network into sub-networks by applying community detection
algorithm and compute topological measures at three levels: (i) the firm level over the whole
system as done in [13], (ii) the firm level over the community, and (iii) the community level by
averaging individual characteristics. Another related contribution is the study proposed by [1],
where the authors examine the exploratory power of a large set of centrality measures on interbank
spread.
Dataset
The construction of a financial network is the cornerstone of our analysis. In this study, we use the
financial spillover network proposed by [2]. The network embeds the financial institutions with
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from 6000 to 6799 from the S&P 500. In addition,
we collect the monthly cum-dividend stock price from Thomson Reuters Eikon for each company.
The initial database, as in [2], covers the period January 1990 to December 2014 and consists
of 155 firms. Three subsequent filters on this initial network were needed in order to recover the
final network on which pre-crisis topological measures are computed. First, we remove institutions
appearing in the sample only after the burst of the financial crisis in January 2008. Second, we
restrict our analysis to stocks with at least 36 consecutive monthly observations in order to filter
out the noise in our data. Eventually, we drop the financial institutions that disappear during the
financial crisis. Our final sample consists of 46 financial institutions embedding banks, broker-
dealers, insurance and real-estate companies listed in the Standard & Poors 500 index. Note that
such a network is similar in size or larger than most related studies on market-based financial
spillovers such as [17], [18] or [19].
Methodology
First, we recover the financial network for the set of institutions comprised in our sample. Second,
we break down the whole network in sub-networks, based on a community detection algorithm
and construct topological measures at system wide and community levels. Third, we compute
a measure of vulnerability during the crisis. Fourth, we regress our measure of vulnerability on
standard topological measures along with community-based topological measures to assess their
marginal contribution. Each step is detailed bellow.
Step 1: Financial Temporal Networks
Our financial networks were built as in [2]. The linkages between financial institutions are retrieved
from stock market prices by means of Bayesian Time-Varying VAR framework and Granger causal-
ity test. According to this approach, an incoming link is created from institution j to institution i
if the time series associated to j Granger causes the time series of i. The details of the methodology
can be found in [2].
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Figure 1: Stock market returns of our sample of US financial institutions (2007-2008).
Step 2: Independent variables
In a second step, we break down the whole network in sub-networks grouping together most
connected nodes. To this end, we apply the Louvain method [20] which is designed to detect com-
munities within complex networks. Equipped with clearly identified community structures, we
compute several topological measures by considering the whole network or only the community-
based local environment. For the sake of clarity, the whole set of variables is divided into three
groups. First, global topological metrics are computed at the firm level over the whole system as
usually done in the literature. Second, we compute the local topological metrics at the firm level
over close peers. Unlike the previous metrics, for each node, we are exclusively considering the
other nodes within the same community when computing our metrics, making topological metrics
limited to intra-community links. Third, in order to further explore the influence of the local
environment, we average individual characteristics over each community to compute aggregated
topological metrics. This means that all the nodes included in the same community display similar
values for this set of variables. Turning to the topological metrics we are considering, we account
for a wide set of standard metrics: In-degree centrality, Out-degree centrality, Betweenness central-
ity, Clustering centrality,1 m-reach centrality, Inverse m-reach centrality, in-Katz centrality and
1For unweighted graphs, the clustering of a node is the fraction of possible triangles associated to that node.
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Out-Katz centrality (detailed explanation of each variable can be found in [21]). To take advantage
of historical changes in the network as well as auxiliary information on firms’ industry, we complete
our analysis with a set of less conventional metrics. Hence, sectoral entropy assesses how divers
in term of sectors a community is. Inter in(out)- degree depicts the number of in(out)-degree
between communities. The inter-intra degree is computed as the ratio of the inter community
degrees over the number of intra community degrees. The measure is applied separately to in
degree and to out degree. Besides, we compute the rate between a firm’s in(out)-degree and its
community in(out)-degree as a measure of the node’s commitment [23]. Finally, two temporal
metrics are added. For this, we simply compute a modified m-reach measure while considering
that the contagious process involves a time lag. For instance, if a firm displays 3 out degrees at
time t, the value for its 1-reach centrality is 3. For the 2-reach centrality measure, we consider the
connections of the 3 neighboring nodes at t+ 1 instead of time t in the usual case. If this value is
equal to 4, the 2-reach centrality measure is 7. The measure takes into account a 1-period delay
at each order of the propagation process. We consider a separate measure for both incoming links
and outgoing links. Figure 2 provides an overview of the variables constructed for the empirical
analysis.
Analysis at different scales of inter-dependencies
Global topological
        (GT)
Aggregated topological
         (AT) 
Local topological 
         (LT) 
 Firm topological characteristics 
computed over the whole system
Each firm carries the average
value of the metrics calculated 
over all the nodes within the 
same community
Firm topological characteristics 
computed over the community 
In-degree centrality
Out-degree centrality
Betweenness centrality
Clustering centrality
In-Katz centrality
Out-Katz centrality 
Static m-reach (in)
Static m-reach (out) 
Temporal m-reach (in)
Temporal m-reach (out) 
In-degree centrality
Out-degree centrality
Betweenness centrality
Clustering centrality
Community degree
In-Katz centrality 
Out-Katz centrality
Static m-reach (in)
Static m-reach (out)
Community size
Sectoral Entropy
Community inter in–degree
Community  inter out-degree
Inter-Intra Community in-degree
Inter-Intra Community out-degree
F in-degree / C intra-in-degree
F out–degree / C intra-out-degree 
In-degree centrality
Out-degree centrality
Betweenness centrality
Clustering centrality
Degree centrality
Static m-reach (in)
Static m-reach (out)
In-Katz centrality
Out-Katz centrality 
Symbols            over links mean those links were eliminated before calculating the measurements   
Figure 2: Three levels of analysis: System wide firms-based metrics, Community firm-
based metrics and Community-based metrics.
Step 3. Dependent variables
Following [19], we use two indicators of firm vulnerability to test the predictive power of our
topological measures: (i) the cumulative stock returns, and alternatively (ii) the peak-to-trough
returns. The former measure is based on daily log-returns. The latter on prices. The cumulative
returns is computed for each firm, as the sum of its stock returns over the crisis period. The
maximum drawdown is computed as the maximum loss from a peak to a trough of the stock price.
As done in the literature, we build on the premise that firms vulnerability is better revealed in
crisis period. The crisis is therefore used as a natural experiment to identify vulnerable institutions
and test whether such fragility could have been detected prior the event by looking at alternative
characteristics such as topological metrics. For robustness purposes, we use two definitions for
the crisis period: (i) July 2007 to December 2008 and January 2008 to December 2008. Figure 1
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illustrates the general patterns for all the firms. The alternative time periods to define the crisis
are marked with a straight line at the bottom of the figure. A rapid overview shows that financial
firms experienced largest losses during the second period (January 2008 to December 2008).
Step 4: Regression analysis
Given the large number of regressors, we apply the Elastic Net (EN) model to perform shrinkage
and identify the most relevant variables2. This approach along with LASSO has been widely used
in the literature to control the degree of sparsity in the model and select only the most significant
coefficients [24]. The objective function in Elastic Net regression is expressed as follows:
minβ0,β{
1
N
N∑
i=1
(yi − β0 − βTxi)2 + λ[(1− α)||β||22/2 + α||β||1]}, (1)
The EN penalty is controlled by the parameter α. Note that if α = 1 it falls into the LASSO
selection model. The second parameter to tune in order to set the penalty is λ. It more specifically
controls the strength of the penalty, i.e, the number of covariates set to zero (if α 6= 0) or shrink
towards zero (if α = 0) for minimization purposes. We chose the λ values via cross validation for
fixed α. We consider 0.5 and 1 as alternative values for α.
The regression framework is convenient to assess the role of local environment information as
opposed to traditional global environment information for computing topological metrics and an-
alyzing systemic risk. For the sake of clarity, we can more specifically formulate three testable
hypotheses.
• H1: Information regarding systemic vulnerability of firms is concentrated at the local level.
If so, information coming from the remaining part of the network only add noise and should
be filtered out.
• H2: Information regarding systemic vulnerability of firms in the local environment is entirely
embodied in the global environment.
• H3: Both local and global levels embeds non overlapping information.
If H1 is true, only LT metrics should appear as significant from a regression including both local
and global topological metrics. If H2 is true conversely, only GT should emerge as significant.
If H3 is true, both LT and GT variables should appear as significant when included in the same
model.
Results
Before interpreting the regression results, we briefly discuss the cross correlation among the topo-
logical metrics. Exploring the dependence among all our metrics might help to have a better sense
of their informational content. A very strong correlation for instance would suggest the absence of
specific information in each variable. Next, we estimate a baseline model. This model is limited
to traditional centrality metrics computed at the network level. Then, we extend the specification
to include community-based metrics. Eventually, we include all the variables in the model. This
stepwise procedure aims to assess the robustness of our findings.
The correlation matrix
For the sake of clarity, the correlation coefficients are visualized with a heatmap (see Figure 3).
Dark colors signal strong correlations. Positive correlations are reported in blue and negative
2Computationally computed by using Glmnet [22]
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ones in red. We can visually separate two groups of variables. The first group embeds most
traditional topological metrics computed either at the network or the community level. Overall,
the variables display positive correlations with nuances regarding their strength as the correlation
coefficients range from 0.1 to 0.9. The positive signs suggest that the various measures embed
consistent information regarding the centrality of institutions. While consistent however, this
information does not fully overlap. A second group includes less conventional measures such as
sectoral entropy or temporal m-reach centrality measures. The correlation values are now weak and
slightly negative with the majority of other variables. Here also, the result supports the interest
of considering a wide variety of centrality indicators as they do not share the same information.
Whether they are informative to predict financial vulnerability remains an open question that the
regressions enable to address.
Figure 3: Correlation Matrix of topological metrics.
First level: Global topological metrics
We first show the results for the regular metrics. In total, the model includes 8 variables, all
computed at the system-wide level. The list of variables can be found in Figure 2. We just not
consider the two temporal (GT) variables in this baseline model. Table 1 reports in row the name
along with the sign of the coefficient of the variables that appear as significant in one of the four
columns. Each column corresponds to an alternative definition of the dependent variable. We
consider four alternatives depending on the definition of both the crisis period - either a period of
12 months or 18 months- and the vulnerability of the firm - computed either as cumulative returns
or maximum drawdown. Four variables are identified as significant regardless of how the dependent
variable has been computed at the exception of the out degree variable which is not significant
in one model. As expected, the signs for the cumulative returns and the maximum drawdown
are opposite. Higher vulnerability corresponds to smaller cumulative returns and larger maximum
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drawdown. To illustrate our results, we can take the example of the Betweenness centrality metric.
Remind that Betweenness centrality is the number of shortest paths that pass through a node.
In our context, each edge represents the existence of spillovers between the asset returns of two
financial institutions. The path means that a distress in one institutions can be channelled to
another one in the network through indirect connections. The Betweenness centrality metric
therefore captures whether a financial firm is located in the path of these financial spillovers. It
can also be viewed as a measure of the capability of a firm to transmit the crisis between separated
groups of firms. Our results support that the higher the number of paths passing through a firm
the greater the losses experienced by this firm during the crisis that is the most vulnerable the
firm is.
Significant variables C. R:12 m C. R:18 m M. D:12 m M. D:18 m
Out-degree centrality (GT) + + −
Betweenness centrality (GT) − − + +
Clustering (GT) − − + +
In-Katz centrality (GT) − − + +
Table 1: Linear multivariate regressions for system wide firm-based metrics
Note: -, + denote the sign of the coefficient for significant variable. The variables not significant are not reported.
The model is estimated by using Elastic Net regression. Each column corresponds to a definition of the dependent
variable. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is computed as cumulative returns over respectively 12 months
and 18 months. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is computed as the maximum drawdown over 12 months
and 18 months, respectively.
Second level: Global and aggregated topological metrics
In the second estimation, we add to the baseline model (GT) all the variables averaged by com-
munity (AT). By doing so, we can assess the stability of the firm-based results along with the
community-level of analysis. Results are depicted in Table 2. The traditional metrics appear
robust, when compared to the first-level estimations. Only three changes are noticeable. The out-
degree variable is now significant with respect to the four alternative definition of the dependent
variable. It appeared as significant in three models previously. The Betweenness centrality is no
more significant when we consider a long period of 18 months for the crisis and the maximum
drawdown to quantify firm losses. Eventually, in-Katz centrality is no more significant when using
a 18 month crisis period and the cumulative returns. Among the 10 variables computed at the
community level, three of them are significant once controlling for traditional system-wide metrics:
clustering, 2-reach and community size. This result means, for instance, that the larger a commu-
nity the more vulnerable a firm is. As opposed to clustering and size, the 2-reach centrality is a
clear measure of temporal propagation and node importance. Its significance at this level of the
analysis stresses its interest among the set of network science metrics for systemic risk analysis.
Third level: Complete model
We complete the analysis by considering the full model. The specification includes the three
categories of variables, adding community firm-based metrics (noted LT in Figure 3) to the previous
model (noted GT and AT in Figure 3). We also add our set of alternative metrics (noted new-
GT and new-AT in Figure 3). As explained in the Step 2 of the methodology, these variables
exploit information embeds in the temporal changes in the network, the sectoral diversity of our
financial firms, as well as, the intra and extra community links. Table 3 reports the results.
System-wide metrics are stable for Betweenness and Clustering. Out-Katz centrality performs
better than the outdegree variable to account for the influence, adding up the influentially of the
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Significant variables C. R:12 m C. R:18 m M. D:12 m M. D:18 m
Out-degree centrality (GT) + + − −
Betweenness centrality (GT) − − +
Clustering centrality (GT) − − + +
In-Katz centrality (GT) − + +
Clustering (AT) − − +
2-reach centrality (AT) − −
Community Size (AT) − + +
Table 2: Linear multivariate regressions for system wide firm-based (GT) metrics and community-
based metrics (AT)
Note: See Table 1
neighbouring nodes. On the other hand, inverted 2-reach centrality took the place of the in-Katz
centrality to express financial vulnerability. The size of the community remains significant, as
expected and explained in the last section. Turning to the community firm-based (LT) metrics,
two variables expressing out-going and in-coming links are the dominant ones at this level. The
first one, is the out-degree centrality. Interestingly, we have earlier noticed that this variable was
significant when computed at the network level. Now that the two variables computed at the
network and the community level are competing in the same model the one at the community
level emerges as the one significant. The second variable is the inverted 2-reach centrality. We can
note that in this case the same metrics computed at both the system wide and the community
level are significant while included in the same model. Among the set of alternative metrics
five variables appear as significant: Inter-intra-outdegree centrality, outreg-intra-outdeg, sectoral
entropy, temporal inverted 2-reach, temporal 2-reach. Recall that Inter-intra-outdegree centrality,
is defined as the ratio between the community out-degree to the other communities in the network
and the out-degree within the same community. What we want to express by such a metric
is the influence that one community has over the whole system, normalized by the own intra-
dependence. The higher the variable the more vulnerable the firm. The second metrics is the
outdeg-intra-outdeg. The creation of this metric was inspired by [23], when defined as the node’s
commitment with its own community. Here the metric is defined as the ratio between the node’s
outdegree and the total outdegree within its community. The sign associated to the first column
when the dependent variable is constructed as cumulative returns is positive. The sign is negative
when considering the maximum drawdown. This result means that the higher the variable the
less vulnerable the firm. The sectoral entropy captures the diversity of sectors within community.
Sectoral diversity was suggested to be a determinant systemic risk in the descriptive analysis of
[21], when computed as the global sector-interface. Our estimations based on a formal regression
analysis confirm this feature. It is worth noting, however, that the metric is sensitive to the time
length, appearing as significant only for the shortest crisis period (12 months). Finally, we have the
temporal versions of the m-reach centrality. Only the one considering outgoing links (Temporal
2-reach) is dominant. This last result point out to the importance of considering higher-order
metrics into systemic risk [25].
Conclusions
In this study, we show that several topological characteristics of financial institutions stemming
from the whole network and sub-parts can predict their vulnerability in crisis period. More
specifically, we document the fact that local information along with global information is useful
to improve our knowledge of systemic institutions. This result is obtained by applying a two-step
procedure in the spirit of [2]. In a first step, we use the approach developed by [2] based on
Time-Varying Parameter Vector AutoRegressive (TVP-VAR) model as well as Granger causality
statistical tests on stock market returns to recover the unobserved spillover network of financial
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Significant variables C. R:12 m C. R:18 m M. D:12 m M. D:18 m
Betweenness centrality (GT) − − + +
Clustering (GT) − − + +
Inverted 2-reach centrality (GT) + + − −
Out-Katz centralitiy (GT) − − + +
Community size (AT) + +
Out-degree centrality (LT) + + − −
Inverted 2-reach centrality (LT) + + −
Inter-intra-outdeg (new-AT) − +
Outdeg-intra-outdeg (new GT) + + −
Sectoral-Entropy (new-AT) + −
Temporal inverted 2-reach (new GT) +
Temporal 2-reach (new GT) − − + +
Table 3: Linear multivariate regressions for system wide firm-based metrics, community-based
metrics and community firm-based metrics
Note: See Table 1
institutions. In a second step, we regress alternative measures of institutions vulnerability on a set
of pre-crisis topological characteristics. We test for the marginal impact of topological measures
computed at firms level with respect to the whole network and with respect to close peers (i.e. we
only consider intra-community links), and averaged by community. Overall, our sample include 46
financial institutions embedding banks, broker-dealers, insurance and real-estate companies listed
in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index.
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